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Publications UAS Grisons


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  • 2022

  • El-Bialy, Nora; Fraile Aranda, Elisa; Nicklisch, Andreas; Saleh, Lamis; Voigt, Stefan (2022): Flight and the preferences for truth-telling. An experimental study among refugees and non-refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Germany. In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 96. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: We report the results of an experiment on the preference for truth-telling in a repeatedly played mind game with Syrian refugees in Jordan and Germany. We compare their behavior with Syrians who still live in Syria as well as with Jordanians and Germans. The average number of lies is surprisingly similar – and low – across all five samples. However, the lying patterns of Syrian refugees are different from non-refugee participants in Germany, Jordan, and Syria itself. Syrian refugee participants are likely to lie more frequently than non-refugee participants. After having lied once, refugee participants resort to a “never return”- pattern significantly more often than the non-refugee participants. A closer look at the socio-demographic characteristics of our Syrian refugee participants reveals lying to be closely associated with higher age, while a longer stay in the host country is negatively correlated with the observation of lying patterns.

  • El-Bialy, Nora; Aranda, Elisa Fraile; Nicklisch, Andreas; Saleh, Lamis; Voigt, Stefan (2022): To cooperate or not to cooperate?. An analysis of cooperation and peer punishment among Syrian refugees, Germans, and Jordanians. In: Journal of Economic Psychology (89). Available online at, last checked on 24.03.2022


    Abstract: Do Syrian civil war victims living in exile treat other Syrian refugees more favorably compared to members of the hosting society? We answer this question by analyzing cooperation decisions in a prisoner’s dilemma with a second stage including punishment among Syrian refugees, Germans, and Jordanians, in two host countries, Germany and Jordan. We find that Syrian refugees are more likely to cooperate when they are interacting with another refugee than when they are interacting with a German or a Jordanian participant. We find opposite results for both Germans and Jordanians who cooperate more when playing with Syrians than within their own group. Self-reported feelings of refugees suggest that in-group favoritism rather than out-group hostility drives this result, while punishment of defecting in-group and out-group members does not differ significantly for all groups. Thus, in-group favoritism seems to be a selective inclination that disappears when it clashes with other characteristics like reciprocity.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas; Chugunova, Marina; Schnapp, Kai-Uwe (2022): Redistribution and production with the subsistence income constraint. A real effort experiment. In: FinanzArchiv. Public Finance Analysis
  • Nicklisch, Andreas (2022): Zahlungsbereitschaft für nachhaltigen Strom (Einblicke in die Forschung). Available online at, last checked on 19.05.2022


    Abstract: Ein verstärkter Einsatz erneuerbarer Energien ist unabdingbar für das Gelingen der Energiestrategie 2050. Aber was sind Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher tatsächlich bereit, für eine nachhaltige Energieversorgung zu zahlen? Eine Studie des ZWF misst Zahlungsbereitschaften für erneuerbare Energien.

  • 2021

  • El-Bialy, Nora; Aranda, Elisa Fraile; Nicklisch, Andreas; Saleh, Lamis; Voigt, Stefan (2021): A Sense of No Future in an Uncertain Present. Altruism and Risk-Seeking among Syrian Refugees in Jordan. In: Journal of Refugee Studies. DOI: 10.1093/jrs/feab037


    Abstract: An unprecedented number of refugees from Syria have sought refuge in both the Middle East and Europe since the beginning of the civil war in Syria in 2011. We analyse the level of altruism and risk-seeking among Syrian civil war victims in Jordan. Our participants are university students who interact with both Jordanians and other Syrians. We find systematic variations in the revealed levels of altruism and their willingness to accept risk among Syrian refugees: feeling as if having no future coincides with both more egoistic and more risk-seeking behaviour. Refugees’ behavioural responses and their sense of no future correlate with their current personal living experiences. Our findings suggest that both the sense of no future and the accompanying behavioural responses are primarily associated with their current living conditions rather than with experiences directly related to the civil war in Syria.

  • Lehmann, Ralph; Moser, Peter; Nicklisch, Andreas; Emmenegger, Mark; Grass, Michael (2021): Industrie und Dienstleister profitieren. In: Die Volkswirtschaft 94 (4), S. 8-11. Available online at, last checked on 20.05.2022


    Abstract: Bei ihrer Einführung im Jahr 2017 war die Swissness-Gesetzgebung umstritten, da viele Firmen zusätzliche Kosten befürchteten. Im Auftrag des Eidgenössischen Instituts für Geistiges Eigentum (IGE) haben die Fachhochschule Graubünden und BAK Economics untersucht, inwiefern und ob sich der Aufwand für Industrie- und Dienstleistungsunternehmen finanziell gelohnt hat. Nach einmaligen Umstellungskosten im Jahr 2017 generierte die Swissness-Gesetzgebung einen unternehmerischen Wert (Mehrumsatz abzüglich Mehrkosten) für alle Swissness-Branchen von 0,9 Milliarden Franken. Gesamtwirtschaftlich beziffert sich der Nettonutzen der neuen Swissness-Gesetzgebung auf 0,2 BIP-Prozentpunkte.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas; Putterman, Louis; Thöni, Christian (2021): Trigger-happy or precisionist?. On demand for monitoring in peer-based public goods provision. In: Journal of Public Economics 200. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: Recent studies question whether societies can self-govern public goods dilemmas with the help of decentralized punishment opportunities. One important challenge is imperfect information about individuals’ contributions. In laboratory experiments, imperfect information increases misdirected punishment and thereby hampers the efficacy of the punishment mechanism. A key question is thus whether those facing such a collective action dilemma would punish despite doubt if they could observe one another’s actions more accurately at some cost. We find that most experimental subjects prefer to engage in costly monitoring before punishing, or else not to punish at all. We demonstrate a price sensitive demand for monitoring, a tendency of known monitoring to serve as a warning of punishment, a taste-based preference for full over partial monitoring, and positive effects of monitoring on cooperation and efficiency.

  • 2020

  • Chugunova, Marina; Luhan, Wolfgang; Nicklisch, Andreas (2020): When to leave carrots for sticks. On the evolution of sanctioning institutions in open communities. In: Economics Letters 191. Available online at, last checked on 04.02.2021


    Abstract: When asked, people dislike punishment institutions, although punishment is more effective thanrewards to maintain cooperation in social dilemmas. Which institution do they choose in the longrun? We study migration patterns in a laboratory experiment that allows participants to migrate con-tinuously between punishment and reward communities. The majority of participants initially choosesthe reward institution, but a substantial number of subjects joins the less profitable punishmentcommunity subsequently. In this case, the mere threat of punishment establishes high contributions.Income differences and missing compensations for cooperators in the reward community are the keyfactors for the decision to migrate

  • Füllbrunn, Sascha; Neugebauer, Tibor; Nicklisch, Andreas (2020): Underpricing of initial public offerings in experimental asset markets. In: Experimental Economics (23), S. 1002-1029. Available online at, last checked on 04.02.2021

    Abstract: The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPO) is a well-documented fact of empirical equity market research. Theories explain this underpricing with market imperfections. We study three empirically relevant IPO mechanisms under almost perfect market conditions in the laboratory: a stylized book building approach, a closed book auction, and an open book auction. We report underpricing in each of these IPO mechanisms. Uncertainty about the aftermarket behavior may partly explain IPO excess returns but underpricing persists even in the repeated setting where uncertainty is negligible and despite the equilibrium adjustment dynamics, that we observe in the data. The data reveal a market-wide impact of investors’ reluctance to sell in the aftermarket at a price below the offering price. We conclude that a behavioural bias similar to the disposition effect fosters IPO underpricing in our setting.

  • Giamattei, Marcus; Huber, Jürgen; Lambsdorff, Johann Graf; Nicklisch, Andreas; Palan, Stefan (2020): Who inflates the bubble? Forecasters and traders in experimental asset markets. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 110. Available online at, last checked on 20.04.2020


    Abstract: We use a laboratory experiment to study how forecasting contributes to mispricing. In the Baseline, we assign both the task of forecasting and the task of trading to the same subject. In treatment SamePay, we separate these tasks and assign them to two different subjects, who share the profits from trade. In treatment Accuracy, we pay forecasters according to the accuracy of their forecasts. We find that the separation of tasks induces some mispricing. Even worse, paying for accuracy reduces attention towards the fundamental value and generates major and persistent mispricing as well as trend extrapolation. We infer that it can be risky to incentivize only forecasting accuracy and not give forecasters the right “skin in the game”. Our findings are informative for tracing the sources of mispricing as well as for enhancing financial stability.

  • Lehmann, Ralph; Moser, Peter; Nicklisch, Andreas; Emmenegger, Mark; Grass, Michael (2020): Swiss Made. Evaluation Swissness-Gesetzgebung. Bericht zuhanden des Eidgenössischen Instituts für Geistiges Eigentum. Available online at, last checked on 21.05.2021


    Abstract: Das Eidgenössische Institut für Geistiges Eigentum (IGE) hat die Fachhochschule Graubünden in Kooperation mit BAK Economics beauftragt, die Auswirkungen der neuen Swissness-Gesetzgebung für die Wirtschaftssektoren Industrie und Dienstleistungen zu analysieren. Die Evaluation soll den Nutzen und die Kosten der Swissness-Gesetzgebung aus unternehmerischer und gesamtwirtschaftlicher Perspektive aufzeigen. Aus unternehmerischer Sicht entsteht ein Nutzen aus der Swissness-Gesetzgebung, wenn diese dazu beiträgt, dass die schweizerische Herkunftsbezeichnung eine Preisprämie generieren kann. Kosten entstehen, wenn die Unternehmen Teile ihrer Beschaffung und Produktion in die Schweiz verlagern müssen, um den Bedingungen des Gesetzes zu entsprechen und diese Verlagerung die Herstellung verteuert. Gesamtwirtschaftlich lässt sich die Bedeutung der Swissness-Gesetzgebung durch den aggregierten Wert der Swissness für die in der Schweiz tätigen Unternehmen sowie die durch die Gesetzgebung entstehenden Verlagerungseffekte abschätzen. Wenn Unternehmen aufgrund des Gesetzes vermehrt in der Schweiz einkaufen und Wertaktivitäten in die Schweiz verlagern, entsteht dadurch zusätzliche Wertschöpfung für die Volkswirtschaft.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas (2020): Facetten gerechter Umverteilung (Einblicke in die Forschung). Available online at, last checked on 09.04.2021


    Abstract: Unser Projekt analysiert den Einfluss von Verantwortlichkeit für Umverteilung auf deren Akzeptanz. Nur demjenigen, der ohne Eigenverschulden hilfsbedürftig ist, wird bereitwillig geholfen. Rentenversicherungssysteme sollten daher jeglichen Zweifel an der Bedürftigkeit der Transferempfängerinnen und -empfänger ausräumen.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas; Paetzel, Fabian (2020) : Need-Based Justice and Distribution Procedures. The Perspective of Economics In: Traub, Stefan; Kittel, Bernhard (Hg.): Need-Based Distributive Justice: An Interdisciplinary Perspective: Cham: Springer, S. 161-189. Available online at, last checked on 04.02.2021


    Abstract: In this chapter, we present both macro-empirical and micro-experimental evidence of how subjects redistribute resources. We identify a moderate level of redistribution both in macro-empirical and experimental work. We present evidence that moderate levels of redistribution are due to the preferences of individuals rather than other possible explanations, such as the interests of elites or institutions. Particularly, we find that moderate redistribution, which transfers resources based on the fairness principle of need-based justice is generally accepted and brings along productivity-enhancing effects instead of efficiency losses.

  • 2019

  • Gerber, Anke; Nicklisch, Andreas; Voigt, Stefan (2019): The role of ignorance in the emergence of redistribution. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 163, S. 239-261. Available online at, last checked on 20.04.2020


    Abstract: Our study investigates the emergence of redistribution societies when individuals vote on distribution rules with their feet. The choice of a distribution rule is a strategic decision since individuals differ in the productivity of their investments and hence total income depends on the types of individuals who have chosen the same distribution rule. In our laboratory experiment, we find that, compared to full information, the amount of redistribution increases if individuals face uncertainty about their productivity at the time they choose a distribution rule. Moreover, we find a coexistence of libertarian and redistributive societies as well as imperfect segregation for all degrees of uncertainty, so that heterogeneous redistribution societies turn out to be sustainable throughout.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas; Putterman, Louis; Thöni, Christian (2019): Trigger-Happy or Precisionist?On Demand for Monitoring in a Noisy SocialDilemma Game. Hamburg (Working Paper). Available online at, last checked on 24.04.2020


    Abstract: Recent experimental studies question whether societies can self-govern social dilemmas with the help of decentralized punishment opportunities. One important challenge for the mechanism is imperfect information about cooperative behavior. It has been shown that imperfect information increases misdirected punishment and thereby hampers the efficacy of the punishment mechanism. We study an environment with monitoring opportunities, in which subjects can improve the quality of their information at a cost. We find experimentally that the majority of subjects are willing to pay a modest cost to improve their information. The demand for monitoring is price sensitive, but does not systematically depend on whether other subjects are informed about the monitoring decision. Almost no subjects take up the chance to monitor partially at a lower price. Rather subjects choose to monitor either perfectly or not at all. Little punishment takes place with imperfect information. The large majority of those subjects who monitor subsequently punish non-cooperative behavior, leading to a substantial and significant improvement in efficiency.

  • 2018

  • Glöckner, Andreas; Kube, Sebastian; Nicklisch, Andreas (2018): The joint benefits of observed and unobserved social sanctions. In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (75), S. 105-116. Available online at, last checked on 23.04.2020


    Abstract: Cooperation problems are at the heart of many societal and environmental problems. Prominent solutions frequently rely on monitoring and punishment by central authorities. In recent years, the focus has shifted to decentralized approaches with mutual monitoring and social sanctions to foster cooperation. In this paper, we empirically test for the role of a specific form of social punishment, namely sanctions that are unobservable at first and only applied with a delay. We observe that in particular the combination of such unobservable sanctions with immediately observable sanctions strongly enhances cooperation within groups. Strikingly, this improvement is not caused by an extensive use of both forms of punishment. Our data suggest that the mere thread of unobservable sanctions increases the effectiveness of observable punishment.

  • Khadjavi, Menusch; Nicklisch, Andreas (2018): Parents’ ambitions and children’s competitiveness. In: Journal of Economic Psychology (67), S. 87-102. Available online at, last checked on 03.07.2020


    Abstract: Individual competitiveness is a personality trait of high importance. While substantial differences between individuals have been documented, the sources of this heterogeneity are not well understood. To contribute to this issue we conduct an incentivized field study with pre-school children. We assess the children’s willingness to compete and relate the inclinations to ambitions and preferences of their parents. Parents’ ambitions concerning their children’s success in professional life predict their children’s competitiveness. In particular, children of highly ambitious parents tend to enter competition even if their chances to win are low. High ambitions are related to a relatively low socioeconomic background.

  • Moser, Peter; Nicklisch, Andreas (2018): Auf dem Holzweg? Die Deklarationspflicht für Holzprodukte. In: Die Volkswirtschaft 91 (4), S. 31-32. Available online at, last checked on 24.06.2022


    Abstract: Die Schweizer Verordnung über die Deklaration von Holz und Holzprodukten unterscheidet sich von der entsprechenden EU-Verordnung. Der Unterschied führt zu deutlichen Mehrkosten bei Importmöbeln. Gemäss einer Analyse von identischen Möbeln in der Schweiz und in Deutschland liegt der Preisaufschlag bei deklarierten Möbeln 14 Prozentpunkte über demjenigen von nicht deklarationspflichtigen oder ungenau deklarierten Möbeln. Die Kosten entstehen möglicherweise dadurch, dass die Schweizer Regelung einen Wechsel von Vorproduktlieferanten systematisch erschwert.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas (2018): Erfolgreich zwischen zwei Stühlen: die Herausforderungen internationaler Forschungspartnerschaften. In: Wissensplatz (2), S. 24-25. Available online at, last checked on 07.12.2018


    Abstract: Wie viel Ungleichheit akzeptieren die Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft in einem staatlichen Umverteilungssystem? Mit dieser Frage beschäftigt sich ein interdisziplinärer Forschungsverbund aus verschiedenen Fachgebieten. Voraussetzungen für den Erfolg dieses internationalen Projekts, an dem sich die HTW Chur beteiligt, sind die Entwicklung einer interdisziplinären Sprache und die Auseinandersetzung mit den unterschiedlichen internationalen Vorgaben.

  • 2017

  • Chugunova, Marina; Nicklisch, Andreas; Schnapp, Kai-Uwe (2017): On the effects of transparency and reciprocityon labor supply in the redistribution systems. Hamburg (Working Paper). Available online at, last checked on 24.04.2020


    Abstract: Although taxation distorts work incentives both for taxpayers and transfer recipients, its net effect on labor provision is shown to be less severe than predicted by the theory. It is likely that the reciprocity between taxpayers and transfer recipients plays an important role in mitigating the negative consequences of redistribution and maintaining a high level of effort. To check it we run a series of real-effort experiments exploring the production effects of taxation in the environment with unilateral monitoring: Taxpayers can continuously monitor the effort of the transfer recipient, which is designed to trigger reciprocity. Surprisingly, we find that monitoring decreases the total labor provision: recipients produce significantly less under monitoring, while the production of the taxpayers remains unchanged.

  • Chugunova, Marina; Nicklisch, Andreas; Schnapp, Kai-Uwe (2017): Redistribution and Production with the Subsistence Income Constraint: a Real-Effort Experiment. Hamburg (Working Paper). Available online at, last checked on 24.04.2020


    Abstract: A large body of literature demonstrates that redistribution leads to inefficiencies due to distorted work incentives. Yet, this result is obtained under the assumption that people are absolutely free in their labor-leisure allocation decisions and that taxation is merely a wage cut. We challenge this assumption and study labor supply decisions in a framework with the subsistence income constraint and a redistribution system which supports disadvantaged players. The results of the real-effort experiment show that the introduction of the moderate subsistence income requirement causes a substantial increase in productivity among taxpayers, with slight additional boost if tax returns are transferred to recipients and not wasted unproductively. As for recipients, the prospect of receiving a transfer significantly enhances their productivity and spurs the overall efficiency leading to a self-sorting of recipients according to their skills.

  • Chugunova, Marina; Luhan, Wolfgang; Nicklisch, Andreas (2017): When to Leave the Carrots for the Sticks. On the Evolution of Sanctioning Institutions in Open Communities. Hamburg (Working Paper). Available online at, last checked on 04.02.2021


    Abstract: There is substantial evidence that punishment is more effective than rewards to maintain cooperation in social dilemmas. Yet, previous findings suggest that people generally dislike negative sanctioning institutions and avoid them when possible. We take a new perspective by directly comparing the migration between punishment and reward regimes in a social dilemma. In our laboratory experiments participants continuously “vote with their feet” by migrating between punishment and reward communities. In line with previous research, the vast majority of subjects in our experiment opts initially for the reward institution. Over time, however, more subjects start to join the less profitable punishment community. Analyzing the conditions which trigger migration, we show that full contributors are the first to migrate to the non-populated punishment communities. Followers cooperate almost fully without the requirement of actual punishment, thus reducing the welfare costs of the institution. Individual data suggest that income differences within communities and missing compensations for cooperators in the reward community are key factors for the decision to migrate.

  • Khadjavi, Menusch; Lange, Andreas; Nicklisch, Andreas (2017): How transparency may corrupt − experimental evidence from asymmetric public goods games. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (142), S. 468-481. Available online at [Titel anhand dieser DOI in Citavi-Projekt übernehmen], last checked on 24.04.2020


    Abstract: We systematically explore the impact of transparency and punishment on cooperation in the provision of public goods. Motivated by problems of embezzlement, we study variations of a public goods game where one player (the official) may embezzle from an existing public good, while others (citizens) can only contribute. We show that transparency induces increased embezzlement in the absence of a punishment mechanism. The qualitative impact of transparency on contributions to the public good is reversed when a punishment mechanism is introduced. We identify stigmatization of the official when actions are not transparent. Only a combination of transparency of actions and peer-punishment options creates full accountability and increases contributions by all players.

  • Marcin, Isabel; Nicklisch, Andreas (2017): Testing the Endowment Effect for Default Rules. In: Review of Law & Economics 13 (2). Available online at, last checked on 24.04.2020


    Abstract: This paper explores potential endowment effects of contractual default rules. For this purpose, we analyze the Hadley liability default clause in a model of bilateral bargaining of lotteries against safe options. The liability default clause determines the right for the safe payoff option. We test the model in series of laboratory experiments. The results reveal a substantial willingness-to-accept to willingness-to-pay gap for the right to change lotteries against safe options. Even if we apply the incentive compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak value elicitation mechanism, there is a significant gap indicating a robust endowment effect caused by default rules. Differences of expected values of the lotteries and the safe options consistently decrease the gaps. Implications for applications of default rules in the law are discussed.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas (2017) : Comment on `How to Deal with Pandemics' In: Eger, Thomas; Oeter, Stefan; Voigt, Stefan (Hg.): International law and the rule of law under extreme conditions: An economic perspective: The XIVth Travemünde Symposium on the Economic Analysis of Law: Travemünde, 27.-29. März 2014: Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, S. 161-164
  • Nicklisch, Andreas; Moser, Peter (2017): Holzmärkte: Ökonomische Kosten der Ausnahmen vom Cassis-de-Dijon-Prinzip. Studie im Auftrag des Staatssekretariats für Wirtschaft SECO. In: Strukturberichterstattung 57 (6). Available online at, last checked on 23.04.2020
  • Nicklisch, Andreas (2017): Handlungen beobachten, Motivationen ableiten: Experimental- und Verhaltensökonomie. In: Wissensplatz (1), S. 26-27. Available online at, last checked on 07.12.2018


    Abstract: Umdenken ist angesagt bei den Ökonominnen und Ökonomen. Jahrzehntelang suchte die Volkswirtschaftslehre nach immer stärkerer Formalisierung. Heute wächst eine neue Generation von Forschenden heran, welche die alten Grenzen de Disziplinen überwindet und sich Interdisziplinarität auf die Fahnen schreibt. Mit viel Psychologie, Biologie, aber auch Informatik versuchen Verhaltens- und Experimentalökonomen und -ökonominnen Handlungen, Gedanken und Ziele der Menschen zu verstehen. Experimental- und Verhaltensökonomie ist ein neuer Bereich, welcher das Angebot des Zentrums für wirtschaftspolitische Forschung (ZWF) erweitert.

  • 2016

  • Mörtenhuber, Sarah; Nicklisch, Andreas; Schnapp, Kai-Uwe (2016): What Goes Around, Comes Around: Experimental Evidence on Exposed Lies. In: Games 7 (4). Available online at, last checked on 11.06.2020


    Abstract: We experimentally investigate the optimal way to handle the uncovering of a noble lie, that is, a lie that supposedly is in the best interest of a given community. For this purpose, we analyze a public good game with feedback to group members on the average contributions of the other group members. The computer program inflates the feedback and shows higher than real average contributions to the high contributors. As shown by earlier studies, the partial feedback inflation increases the total payoff of the public good as it avoids the feeling of being a sucker for above average contributors. The lie is then uncovered and we continue with different feedback modes on contributions, some inflated, some true. We find that players respond similarly to both feedback modes. However, with true feedback, initial contributions in the second stage are significantly higher than with inflated feedback.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas; Grechenig, Kristoffel; Thöni, Christian (2016): Information-sensitive Leviathans. In: Journal of Public Economics 144, S. 1-13. Available online at, last checked on 11.06.2020


    Abstract: We study information conditions under which individuals are willing to delegate their sanctioning power to a central authority. We design a public goods game in which players can move between institutional environments, and we vary the observability of others’ contributions. We find that the relative popularity of centralized sanctioning crucially depends on the interaction between the observability of the cooperation of others and the absence of punishment targeted at cooperative individuals. While central institutions do not outperform decentralized sanctions under perfect information, large parts of the population are attracted by central institutions that rarely punish cooperative individuals in environments with limited observability.

  • 2015

  • Nicklisch, Andreas (2015): Auktionen. Blut und Wasser schwitzen. In: Sponsors, 2015 (01.04.2015), S. 40-41
  • 2014

  • Bock, Olaf; Baetge, Ingmar; Nicklisch, Andreas (2014): hroot: Hamburg Registration and Organization Online Tool. In: European Economic Review 71, S. 117-120. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: hroot (Hamburg Registration and Organization Online Tool) is a web-based software designed for managing participants of economic experiments. This package provides important features to assure a randomized invitation process based on a filtered, pre-specified subject pool, and a complete documentation of the selection procedure for potential participants of an experiment.

  • Engel, Christoph; Beckenkamp, Martin; Glöckner, Andreas; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Kube, Sebastian; Kurschilgen, Michael; Morell, Alexander; Nicklisch, Andreas; Normann, Hans-Theo; Towfigh, Emanuel (2014): First impressions are more important than early intervention. Qualifying broken windows theory in the lab. In: International Review of Law and Economics 37, S. 126-136. Available online at


    Abstract: Broken windows: the metaphor has changed New York and Los Angeles. Yet it is far from undisputed whether the broken windows policy was causal for reducing crime. The scope of the theory is not confined to crime. The theory claims that crime is inextricably linked to social order more generally. In a series of lab experiments we put two components of this more general theory to the test. We show that first impressions and early punishment of antisocial behaviour are independently and jointly causal for cooperativeness. The effect of good first impressions and of early vigilance cannot be explained with, but adds to, participants’ initial level of benevolence. Mere impression management is not strong enough to maintain cooperation. Cooperation stabilizes if good first impressions are combined with some risk of sanctions. Yet if we control for first impressions, early vigilance only has a small effect. The effect vanishes over time.

  • 2013

  • Ding, Jieyao; Nicklisch, Andreas (2013): On the impulse in impulse learning. In: Economics Letters 121 (2), S. 294-297. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates the nature of impulses in impulse learning. Particularly, we analyze whether positive feedback (i.e., yielding a superior payoff in a game) or negative feedback (i.e., yielding an inferior payoff in a game) leads to a systematic change in the individual choices. The results reveal that subjects predominantly learn from negative feedback.

  • Fiedler, Susann; Glöckner, Andreas; Nicklisch, Andreas; Dickert, Stephan (2013): Social Value Orientation and information search in social dilemmas. An eye-tracking analysis. In: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120 (2), S. 272-284. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: Previous work has demonstrated that Social Value Orientation (SVO) is related to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. However, little is known concerning the underlying processes. In two eye-tracking studies investigating decisions in money allocation tasks (Experiment 1) and Public Good Dilemmas (Experiment 2), we show that differences in SVO are accompanied by consistent differences in information search. Decision time, number of fixations, the proportion of inspected information, the degree of attention towards the others’ payoffs, and the number of transitions from and towards others’ payoffs gradually increase with absolute SVO deviation from a pure selfish orientation. Overall these effects seem to be similar for individuals caring positively (i.e., cooperative) or negatively (i.e., competitive) about others. The fact that changes are gradual instead of abrupt indicates that differences in SVO seem to be related to gradual changes in weights given to outcomes for self and others.

  • 2012

  • Nicklisch, Andreas (2012): Does collusive advertising facilitate collusive pricing?. Evidence from experimental duopolies. In: European Journal of Law and Economics 34 (3), S. 515-532. DOI: 10.1007/s10657-010-9180-0


    Abstract: This article analyzes experimentally whether the degree of collusion for one dimension of duopolists’ interactions influences the degree of collusion for another dimension. More precisely, I will explore whether a high degree of collusion for advertisement expenditures facilitates tacit price collusion. Two environments are tested, in which the size of the spillover between advertising expenditures is varied. The results indicate that both degrees of collusion are correlated: a high degree of collusion on advertising functions as a signalling device triggering a significantly higher degree of price collusion by the opponent. Thus advertising expenditures seem to be a useful indicator for market regulators to detect non-competitive pricing.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas; Wolff, Irenaeus (2012): On the nature of reciprocity. Evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (3), S. 892-905. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatum game that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punishment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the degree of first-mover unkindness determines the severity of punishment actions even when marginal costs are absent. The proportion of these participants strongly depends on a treatment variation: higher fixed costs of punishment more frequently lead to extreme responses. The fractions of purely selfish and inequity-averse participants are small and stable. Among the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our findings. We discuss ways of incorporating our findings into the existing models.

  • 2011

  • Glöckner, Andreas; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Kube, Sebastian; Nicklisch, Andreas; Normann, Hans-Theo (2011): Leading with(out) sacrifice?. A public-goods experiment with a privileged player. In: Economic Inquiry 49 (2), S. 591-597. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: We analyze two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas (2011): Learning strategic environments. An experimental study of strategy formation and transfer. In: Theory and Decision 71 (4), S. 539-558. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: I present an experiment on learning about a game in an initially unknown environment. Subjects play repeatedly simple 2 × 2 normal-form coordination games. I compare behavioral learning algorithms for different feedback information. Minimal feedback only informs about own payoffs, while additional feedback informs about own payoffs and the opponent’s choice. Results show that minimal feedback information leads to a myopic learning algorithm, while additional feedback induces non-myopic learning and increases the impulse with which players respond to payoff differences. Finally, there is evidence for a strategy transfer across games which differ only according to the relabel of actions, but not according to permutation in the payoff matrix.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas; Wolff, Irenaeus (2011): Cooperation Norms in Multiple-Stage Punishment. In: Journal of Public Economic Theory 13 (5), S. 791-827. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: We analyze the interplay between cooperation norms and people’s punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game with multiple punishment stages. By combining multiple punishment stages with self-contained episodes of interaction, we are able to disentangle the effects of retaliation and norm-related punishment. An additional treatment provides information on the norms bystanders use in judging punishment actions. Partly confirming previous findings, punishment behavior and bystanders’ opinions are guided by an absolute norm. This norm is consistent over decisions and punishment stages and requires full contributions. In the first punishment stage, our results suggest a higher personal involvement of punishers, leading to a nonlinearity defined by the punishers’ contribution. In later punishment stages, the personal-involvement effect vanishes and retaliation kicks in. Bystanders generally apply the same criteria as punishers in all stages.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas; Fiedler, Susann; Glöckner, Andreas (2011) : The influence of social value orientation on information processing in repeated voluntary contribution mechanism games. An eye-tracking analysis In: Innocenti, Alessandro; Sirigu, Angela (Hg.): Neuroscience and the Economics of Decision Making: 1st ed.: Florence: Taylor & Francis Group, S. 21-53

    Abstract: Many everyday situations are characterized by a social dilemma structure. Imagine, for instance, a situation in which the inhabitants of two villages intend to build a bridge over a river that divides both villages. The bridge would be beneficial for both villages by improving trades and reducing traveling costs, and so on. Building the bridge would necessitate a certain amount of money, which people would have to contribute to the project in order to realize it. Everybody would potentially benefit from the bridge, so the social goals would be maximized if the bridge was built. Let us assume that all contributions are voluntary and it is not possible to force anybody to pay because there is no law that allows this. Let us further assume that no one can be effectively excluded from using the bridge. In such a situation, for each person it would be optimal to save their own share and to free-ride on other people’s contributions. In abstract terms, a social dilemma is characterized by socially efficient behavior (here: all contribute money to the bridge) standing in conflict with individual interests (here: saving the money). It is surprising how many situations in the real world have such a structure. For example, actions of environmental protection (e.g., buying an electrically powered car or the more expensive natural deodorant), decisions about paying for public television or transportation, voting, or situations in your private entourage like investing in a group present for a friend’s birthday. All of these examples have one thing in common: you can decide whether you want to cooperate or free-ride. Many of these situations occur repeatedly. In highly controlled laboratory studies, behavior in social dilemma situations is often investigated in prisoner dilemma tasks (Rapoport and Chammah 1965) or, in their generalized form, public-good games. There is much research on the factors influencing cooperation in public-good games. One of the crucial factors seems to be people’s social orientations.

  • 2010

  • Grechenig, Kristoffel; Nicklisch, Andreas; Thöni, Christian (2010): Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt. A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty. In: Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 7 (4), S. 847-867. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: Under a great variety of legally relevant circumstances, people have to decide whether or not to cooperate when they face an incentive to defect. The law sometimes provides people with sanctioning mechanisms to enforce pro-social behavior. Experimental evidence on voluntary public goods provision shows that the option to punish others substantially improves cooperation, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about the behavior of others. We investigate sanctions in a world with “reasonable doubt” about the contributions of others. Interestingly, people reveal a high willingness to punish even if their information about cooperation rates is highly inaccurate. If there is some nontrivial degree of noise, punishment (1) cannot establish cooperation high and (2) reduces welfare even below the level of a setting without punishment. Our findings suggest that sufficient information accuracy about others' behavior is crucial for the efficiency of sanction mechanisms. If a situation is characterized by low information accuracy, precluding sanctions, for example, through high standards of proof, is likely to be optimal.

  • Jekel, Marc; Nicklisch, Andreas; Glöckner, Andreas (2010): Implementation of the Multiple-Measure Maximum Likelihood strategy classification method in R. Addendum to Glöckner (2009) and practical guide for application. In: Judgment and Decision Making 5 (1), S. 54-63. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: One major challenge to behavioral decision research is to identify the cognitive processes underlying judgment and decision making. Glöckner (2009) has argued that, compared to previous methods, process models can be more efficiently tested by simultaneously analyzing choices, decision times, and confidence judgments. The Multiple-Measure Maximum Likelihood (MM-ML) strategy classification method was developed for this purpose and implemented as already-to-use routine in STATA, a commercial package for statistical data analysis. In the present article, we describe the implementation of MM-ML in R, a free package for data analysis under the GNU general public license, and we provide a practical guide to application. We also provide MM-ML as an easy-to-use R function. Thus, prior knowledge of R programming is not necessary for those interested in using MM-ML.

  • Lobinger, Babett; Hohmann, Tanja; Nicklisch, Andreas (2010): Analyse subjektiver und objektiver Auswirkungen von Regeländerungen im Stabhochsprung. In: Zeitschrift für Sportpsychologie 17 (1), S. 12-20. DOI: 10.1026/1612-5010/a000002


    Abstract: Die Auswirkungen von Regeländerungen auf das subjektive Erleben von Sportlerinnen und Sportlern sind wenig untersucht. Im Rahmen einer Interviewstudie wurden 12 deutsche Stabhochspringerinnen und -springer zu den umfassenden Regeländerungen ihrer Disziplin im vorolympischen Jahr 2003 befragt. Die subjektiven Eindrücke der Athletinnen und Athleten wurden anschließend mit objektiven Daten verglichen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Anpassungsleistungen im Bereich der Bewegungsvorstellung sowie der Bewegungsausführung und taktischen Wettkampfgestaltung erfolgten, aber einige Sportlerinnen und Sportler dennoch den Eindruck hatten, dass sich die Regeländerungen negativ auf ihre Leistungen auswirkten. Die objektiven Daten zeigen weder die befürchteten Leistungseinbußen, noch lassen sich Zusammenhänge zwischen dem subjektiven Zeitdruck aufgrund der verkürzten Versuchszeiten und den tatsächlichen Ablaufzeiten finden. Aufbauend auf den Ergebnissen und deren kritischer Diskussion werden Empfehlungen für die Praxis gegeben.

  • Petersen, Niels; Nicklisch, Andreas (2010) : Vertragstheorie In: Towfigh, Emanuel; Petersen, Niels (Hg.): Ökonomische Methoden im Recht: Eine Einführung für Juristen: Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, S. 117-132
  • Towfigh, Emanuel; Nicklisch, Andreas (2010) : Mikroökonomie In: Towfigh, Emanuel; Petersen, Niels (Hg.): Ökonomische Methoden im Recht: Eine Einführung für Juristen: Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, S. 35-70
  • 2009

  • Alewell, Dorothea; Nicklisch, Andreas (2009): Wage differentials and social comparison. An experimental study of interrelated ultimatum bargaining. In: International Review of Law and Economics 29 (3), S. 210-220. Available online at


    Abstract: Equal pay for equal work is discussed in many different legal and political contexts. Our study explores one consequence of this formula, the effect of social comparison for wage acceptance, in multilateral ultimatum games. The results of our laboratory experiments indicate that the availability of information concerning ultimatum offers to other responders influences acceptance behavior even if responders have differing outside options. Particularly, behavior is only partly influenced by self-regarding social comparison; that is, the probability of acceptance decreases significantly for offers that put responders at a substantial disadvantage compared with others. On the contrary, responders are also partly concerned about unfavorable discrimination against others. However, we find that in our setting, i.e. in a setting where the wage offer relation is endogenously chosen, a slightly unequal relation maximizes the joint acceptance frequency for both responders.

  • Cantner, Uwe; Güth, Werner; Nicklisch, Andreas; Weiland, Torsten (2009): Competition in product design. An experiment exploring innovation behavior. In: Metroeconomica 60 (4), S. 724-752. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: We experimentally investigate competition for innovations in a patent race scenario. Pairs of subjects compete as seller firms on a duopoly market, investing in risky search. Successful innovations resulting thereof are rewarded via temporary monopoly rents. Classifying investor types reveals that most of them invest according to objective investment criteria, such as probability of search success and cash flow, as well as to non-pecuniary criteria, such as intensity of competition and relative performance. For a minority, however, no such correlation is ascertained.

  • Nicklisch, Andreas (2009): The (De)composition of Firms. Interdependent Preferences of Corporate Actors. In: European Business Organization Law Review 10 (2), S. 291-305. Available online at, last checked on 26.11.2021


    Abstract: This article discusses the limitations of the orthodox economic theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts. Various experimental studies have shown that the aggregation of individuals in groups changes behaviour and preferences systematically. This perspective has been formalised by models of interdependent preferences. Based on a prominent approach of interdependent preferences, intention-based preferences, two types of labour contracts, incentive contracts and bonus contracts are analysed. Results are compared with the predictions of the orthodox economic theory.

  • 2007

  • Fischer, Sven; Nicklisch, Andreas (2007): Ex Interim Voting. An experimental Study of Referendums for Public-Good Provision. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 163 (1), S. 56-74. Available online at


    Abstract: We report the results of an experimental study that compares voting mechanisms in the provision of public goods. Subjects can freely decide how much they want to contribute. Whether the public good is finally provided is decided by a referendum under full information about all contributions. If provision is rejected, contributions are reduced by a fee and reimbursed. We compare unanimity with majority voting and both with the baseline of cheap talk. Contributions are highest under unanimity. Yet, results concerning overall efficiency are mixed. When provision occurs, only unanimity enhances efficiency. Overall, however, unanimity leads to too many rejections.

  • 2005

  • Nicklisch, Andreas (2005): Experimental studies on strategic research and development. Zugl.: Jena, Universität, Dissertation, 2005. Berlin:
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